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Abstract
Recognizing the advantages of primary care as a means of improving the entire health system, this text 
comments on reforms of publicly funded primary health centers, and the rapid development of private for-
profit providers in Sweden. Many goals and expectations are connected to such reforms, which equally require 
critical analyses of scarce resources, professional trust/motivation and business logic in the wake of freedom 
and control of ownership and management. In line with Saltman and Duran, this article calls for research and 
a methodologically developed approach to capture everyday practice in-depth and how regulation, market 
incentives and patient demands are met by professionals and primary care leaders.
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In a recent debate article “Governance, Government, and the Search for New Provider Models,” Saltman and Duran reflect groundbreaking processes in reforming tax-based 
health and their complexity in two European countries.1 
One of the examples springs from Swedish primary care and 
discusses governments’ strategies of steering providers based 
on market incentives and management structures encouraging 
efficient performance and citizens’ possibility of enlisting 
with a primary care provider of their choice.1 Their article is 
interesting in several ways, covering a substantial change in 
favor of primary care centers. The rapid development of new 
ways to operate primary care and new private actors implies 
a break with traditionally public provision and organization, 
which has dominated Swedish healthcare the last 50 years. It is 
a controversial change that has received much attention, both 
in and outside Sweden.2,3 However, despite their insightful 
observations, I argue herein that further key dimensions need 
to be explored in order to capture consequences, intended 
as well as unintended, and to understand the dynamics of 
complexity in the case in focus.
The shift in governance, since 2007, aiming for competition 
and choice in primary care, was established in 2010 following 
a change of the Health and Medical Service Act. Freedom of 
enlisting encourages citizens to choose their primary health 
center, among public and private providers, and freedom of 
establishment makes it possible for private for-profit actors 
to establish primary care centers and compete for patients.2 It 
means that primary care centers no longer have a guaranteed 
population to serve, based on catchment areas, but should 
work on access and responsiveness to attract and maintain 
enlisted patients2 as well as work on their own management of 
high quality. The purpose of this commentary is to contribute 
to the discussion of new provider models and practice in 
primary care by further uncovering embedded complexity 
and how it can be studied. 
Swedish Primary Care Centers, Goals and Providers
The Swedish health system is often cited because of its very 
good health outcomes, ie, low mortality of heart infarctions, 
breast and colorectal cancer, comparatively few infant deaths, 
few methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
infections together with a satisfactory level of  ‘avoidable’ 
deaths and a broad range of service provided, at the same time 
as its persistent problems continue to surprise: poor access, and 
long waiting times.4 Hindering bureaucracy, high pressure on 
emergency care and low patient- and service-orientation are 
other problems addressed.4 Thus, new governance is aiming 
for the empowerment and autonomy of caretakers, factors 
shown to improve patient compliance and health status.2 
Putting primary care in the driver’s seat of a healthcare system 
entails efforts to obtain its fundamental pillars: first-contact 
care; continuity of care over time; comprehensiveness, or 
concern for the entire patient rather than a one-organ system; 
and coordination with other parts of the health system.5,6
In Sweden, about 10 million citizens are covered by 
approximately 1200 public and private primary care centers, 
comprising 10% of the overall healthcare budget.3 The 
reforms are applied to a community model for primary care 
typical for Sweden since the 1970s, but rather unique in an 
international perspective.2 The Swedish primary care center, 
in contrast with most other the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD)  countries, employs 
a multidisciplinary workforce with some 4–10 general 
practitioners (GPs) working together with several other 
professionals, such as district nurses, physical therapists, 
social workers, occupational therapists, psychologists 
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and nurses specializing in diabetes and asthma/chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and other chronical 
symptoms.3 Internationally, primary care is usually provided 
by single or small groups of private GPs.5 But the trend in 
publicly funded primary care is apparently moving in the 
direction of publicly salaried multidisciplinary employees.6 
With their multidisciplinary workforce, primary care centers 
are well-equipped to provide a large range of services, many 
of which are directly referred to specialized care in other 
systems. Primary care in the driver’s seat is considered to 
‘free’ hospitals from patients with less serious problems not 
needing specialized resources, guiding the patient to the right 
level within the health system, without a formal function as 
gate-keeper.6,7 
Scarce Resources: Shortage of General Practitioners
Nonetheless, overall resources have not been allocated 
accordingly, with a great emphasis on specialized healthcare 
and hospital care, and with only 17% left for primary care.3 
The shortage of GPs is furthermore considered alarming. 
With only 16% of specialized doctors trained for primary 
care,3 Sweden has a lower proportion of GPs than most 
other comparable countries.8 Physician density varies among 
Swedish counties, and most GP as well as private primary care 
centers are found in the three largest cities, while northern 
regions and individual counties struggle to fill GP vacancies.7 
Many GP positions are held by physicians undergoing their 
mandatory practical training, substitutes and physicians from 
manpower agencies or doctors trained outside of Sweden. 
This has been hard on budgets and patient continuity.7 Some 
explanations are a high level of retirement among GPs and 
medical graduates avoiding primary care, as well as adverse 
workloads and working conditions which lead many doctors 
to prefer part-time.5,7 
Patients want to follow their doctors, if possible, even when 
they change workplaces. However, with the new provider 
model it is difficult to develop an individual-physician 
relationship, with some few exceptions. This is contradictory, 
as continuity might be a major reason why patients make a 
choice.7 Yet, the new governance has been arranged based 
on experience from the failure of a previous Swedish reform 
involving registration with one family doctor.1 With the new 
model, providers are free to manage and design working 
conditions, which might be a means to attract physicians 
with higher salaries, more autonomy, more time to meet 
the patients, better work environments, and freedom from 
unrewarding administrative tasks. One observation is that care 
centers managed by physicians tend to have sufficient medical 
manning and subsequently better financial results. Another 
is that several public care centers suffer from insufficient 
revenues with the risk of closing down.7 Apparently, the new 
governance means that competition is not solely a question 
of public listing, but also one of enhancing the attraction of 
primary care in the eyes of GPs and specialized nurses, ie, 
scarce manning resources. It is also about winning people’s 
trust and promoting the legitimacy of always seeking primary 
service for non-life-threatening health problems. 
Trust, Motivation and Business Logic
Public ownership still dominates but with a new provider 
model, the number of private primary care providers has 
increased substantially (+80%) and almost all new providers 
are private and profit-driven companies. However, the 
proportion of private primary care units varies substantially 
across counties/regions.7 Areas that have experimented with 
new models early have a significantly higher share of private 
providers today, eg, in Stockholm more than 50% of primary 
care centers are privately owned, whereas only a few private 
units exist in the northern part of Sweden.2,7 Inequity is not 
considered a problem, but some observations are made that 
new providers seem to avoid areas with complex care needs.9 
The aim to get more and stronger non-profit actors is far 
from being materialized1,2 instead most providers are profit-
driven companies with several of the big actors having foreign 
owners.10 Consequently, the entire system and its dynamics 
tend to be under transition. Some have debated risks of a new 
oligopoly with private providers acting monopolistically.2 A 
subsequent question is whether, when the healthcare system 
imitates private business, we can rely on professionals and 
the public-service ethos to deliver good quality on ethical 
grounds? And what about primary care centers in the hands 
of business, sometimes foreign and sometimes owned by 
risk-taking funding groups, aiming for good returns on 
their investments? Furthermore, choice reform has shown to 
contrast efficient coordination of health and social care for 
elderly with greater needs,11 and how should that be tackled 
in the future?
As a result of decentralized governance in Sweden, each region 
can design its regulations and financial incentives and achieve 
various practices and outcomes. This entails that it is more 
difficult to aggregate national information on contracted 
service and practice and to make comparisons among models 
and practices.2,3 This obstacle is salient, as providers generally 
respond as expected to incentives, namely by offering more 
and more often services that provide high compensation, 
and regrettably including services that are of marginal value, 
useless, or even harmful.12 The long-term effects in terms 
of quality improvements, innovativeness, problem-solving 
and resistance are hard to conclude, however, owing to the 
lack of evidence based on systematic and robustly designed 
research.12 
Governance based on incentives also risks unintended 
consequences such as gaming, playing, resistance, social 
and group norms and other ways of distorting data, as 
measuring becomes more important than producing quality.12 
Lack of autonomy and feelings of decreased motivation 
among professionals might be other consequences,10 while 
prioritization of easier symptoms and problems at the expense 
of the chronically ill and elderly people with multiple problems 
is an additional consequence of focusing on patients’ choices 
and demands.5
With new governance comes higher demands on governments 
to ensure the quality of healthcare for patients and citizens, 
and to provide systems that allow transparency,2 not least in 
connection with private for-profit providers. The national 
government’s responsibility is exercised through broadly-
written ‘framework’ legislation as well as through a number of 
national agencies and ongoing statistical surveys for assessing 
service quality and outcomes.3 The overall intention is to 
NOT limit competition, which is why Swedish legislation 
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includes no restrictions on the type of private entity that 
could own and/or operate new primary care practice, or any 
other kinds of limitations of governance.7 Considered highly 
controversial, an ongoing debate questions why the welfare 
service sector in Sweden is less regulated than in many other 
countries. This is expressed as a trade-off between regulation 
and control, on the one hand, and capital and innovative care, 
on the other.13
Capturing Practice and Outcome 
Implementing major structural changes and market 
incentives has proven to be difficult, as different levels of the 
health system are usually loosely coupled to each other. At the 
micro level, flexibility is necessary to handle local conditions 
and adapt to needs.1 One negative consequence is that 
organizations can take on formal decisions from central levels 
to satisfy demands for change, without letting changes have 
a real impact on concrete activities. In knowledge-intensive 
activities such as healthcare, it is common that professionals 
operating independently shut themselves off from central 
requirements that are not perceived as meaningful. 
Accordingly, the units fulfill formal requirements and 
reporting, but the work itself is not affected.12 When studying 
implementation empirically, it is, therefore, important to pay 
attention to the local organizational context, in terms of factors 
that can both prevent and facilitate a real change. Expressed 
in terms of Saltman and Duran, well-functioning governance 
is formed at the macro level, but in the end what is crucial is 
how regulation and incentives are understood and manifested 
in daily work.1 Capturing everyday practice is easier said 
than done, however. There is little research about what is 
happening in new primary care centers after the reform, 
and qualitative approaches aiming for thick descriptions 
are needed. A Swedish case study of that kind is currently 
underway, focusing on primary care centers with varying 
forms of ownership, all of which are regarded as successful. In 
order to catch everyday practice and how regulation, market 
incentives and patient demands are met by professionals and 
primary care leaders, interviews as well as observations are 
being intertwined with studies of registries and documents. 
Early findings explore providers’ management and how 
professionals in primary care centers engage differently with 
financial incentives, expressed as ‘What we do is the same but 
how we do it is different.’14 
The new model places the Swedish health system on the 
horns of a dilemma: how to simultaneously mobilize capital, 
innovation and cost-efficient service, while care-users and 
citizens experience freedom of choice, satisfaction, and 
empowerment (that their needs, demands and taxes are 
properly considered), and at the same time motivate providers 
toward efficient care of high quality (neither too much nor too 
little) based on ethical behavior and job satisfaction. The list of 
goals and expectations is long, and contradictions and trade-
offs once again confirm the complex nature of healthcare. 
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